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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A FACTOR IN
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS IN
NEW YORK STATE
Hon. Judith J. Gische*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the New York State Legislature mandated that trial
courts consider the effect of domestic violence in child custody and
visitation disputes.' In 1998, the legislature amended the law to
provide that, under most circumstances, a person convicted of mur-
dering a child's parent shall be denied custody and visitation.2
The amendment was in response to a growing national trend to
give greater attention to the serious effect domestic violence has on
children. While the law now conveys the seriousness with which
the legislature views domestic violence, many problems inherent in
resolving custody and visitation disputes involving domestic vio-
lence still remain.
This essay examines the legislation and case law arising out of
this issue, identifying remaining problems and judicial responses.
Additional interventions will be suggested to assist in the appropri-
ate resolution of these cases.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1996, the state legislature amended section 240 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") to provide that in connec-
tion with determining the "best interests" of the child in custody
and/or visitation disputes, the court is mandated to consider as a
factor, if raised, the issue of domestic violence. Thus, section
240.1(a) of the DRL now provides in pertinent part:
Where either party to an action concerning custody of a right to
visitation with a child alleges in a sworn petition or complaint or
sworn answer, cross-petition, counterclaim or other sworn re-
sponsive pleading that the other party has committed an act of
* Acting Supreme Court Justice presiding over the dedicated matrimonial part
in Bronx County, New York. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and
good counsel of Eileen Kaspar,Esq. in connection with the preparation of this essay.
1. See 1996 N.Y. Laws, ch. 85, § 1 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240.1(a)
(McKinney 1996)).
2. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(a) (McKinney 1998).
3. See 1996 N.Y. Laws 85, § 1.
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domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a
family or household member of either party.., and such allega-
tions are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best
interest of the child, together with such other facts and circum-
stances as the court deems relevant in making a direction pursu-
ant to this section.4
In 1998, the legislature amended section 240.1-c of the DRL and
added section 1085 of the Family Court Act ("FCA") to prohibit
an award of custody or visitation to a person convicted of murder-
ing the child's parent, except in very limited circumstances.5 The
1998 amendment provides in pertinent part:
no court shall make an order providing for visitation or custody
to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first or
second degree ... of a parent, legal custodian or legal guardian
of any child who is the subject of the proceeding
[n]otwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision a court may
order visitation or custody where: ... such child is of a suitable
age to signify assent and such child assents to such visitation or
custody; or... if such child is not of suitable age to signify as-
sent, the child's custodian or legal guardian assents to such or-
der, or ... the person who has been convicted of murder in the
first or second degree ... can prove ... that... [h]e or she, or a
family or household member of either party, was a victim of do-
mestic violence by the victim of such murder; and.., the domes-
tic violence was causally related to the commission of such
murder; and ... the court finds that such visitation or custody is
in the best interests of the child.6
Section 240 of the DRL sets forth the "best interest" standard
for courts to employ in all custody and visitation disputes. Case
law interpreting "best interests" has developed common law fac-
tors which, within the court's discretion, should be considered
before a decision is made.7 The 1996 amendment provides the only
4. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240.1(a) (McKinney 1999).
5. See 1998 N.Y. Laws 150, § 1.
6. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(b).
7. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (App. Div. 1992) (weighing factors
such as 1) the quality of the home environment; 2) the ability of each parent to pro-
vide for the child's emotional needs and her financial status; 3) the ability of each
parent to provide for the child; 4) the individual needs and expressed desires of the
child; and 5) the need of the child to live with a sibling). See also Lynn W. v. Guy C.,
519 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (App. Div. 1987); Gill v. Gill, 523 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (App. Div.
1987); Cornelius C. v. Linda C., 506 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (App. Div. 1986); Milton v.
Dennis, 464 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div. 1983).
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
statutorily mandated factor, domestic violence, that the court must
consider. The 1998 amendment is even stronger because it elimi-
nates judicial discretion and mandates a result in custody and visi-
tation cases involving a murder conviction of the petitioning
parent.
The 1996 amendment was adopted in response to a growing na-
tional concern about the effect of domestic violence on children.
In 1990, a joint resolution of Congress urged the states to adopt a
legislative presumption that it is detrimental to a child when cus-
tody is awarded to an abusive spouse.8 The Model Code on Do-
mestic and Family Violence, developed by the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges in 1994, and a report by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") adopted this Congressional
recommendation. 9
New York was one of the last states to adopt the recommended
legislation. Thus, before the New York amendment was adopted in
1996, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia already had
laws making domestic violence a relevant factor in custody and vis-
itation determinations.'" By 1997, the number of states grew to
forty-four" and, according to the most recent information from the
ABA, forty-six states currently require consideration of domestic
violence before custody decisions are made.' 2
The New York statute, adopted six years after the original na-
tional proposal, differs from the congressional proposal in one ma-
jor respect. New York expressly declined to adopt a presumption
against awarding custody to a battering parent and, instead, only
mandated that domestic violence be considered by courts as a fac-
tor in making such awards. Further, the statutory mandate only
applies when allegations of violence are contained in a sworn
pleading.' 3 In this regard, the New York amendment reflects the
8. See H.R.J. Res. 172, 102d Cong. (1990).
9. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF Juv. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOM. &
FAM. VIOLENCE § 401 (1996).
10. See id.
11. See Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the
Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a
Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1997).
12. See American Bar Association, Family Law Section, Tables Summarizing the
Law in Fifty States, Chart 2: Custody Criteria (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/family/familylaw/table2.html>.
13. Certainly the court still has the discretion to consider issues of domestic vio-
lence even when they are not raised in a sworn pleading notwithstanding that the
statutory mandate does not apply. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-
1747-97, V-1277-97, V-1278-97, 1998 WL 425464, at *6-7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 19,
1998).
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tension between the strong public policy in favor of protecting chil-
dren from the effects of a violent household and the concern that
general, non-particularized claims of violence could be raised in or-
der to gain an unfair advantage in a custody/visitation dispute.14
II. CASE LAW
Even before the statutory mandate was enacted, many courts
had seriously considered the issue of domestic violence in connec-
tion with custody and visitation disputes.15 Consideration of the
issue, however, was not uniform.16 Thus, the New York amend-
ments ensure that the issue, if properly raised, must be considered.
Despite the fact that trial courts are statutorily obligated to con-
sider domestic violence, courts still have an enormous amount of
discretion in reaching a decision in a particular custody or visita-
tion dispute. Where the existence of domestic violence is factually
contested, the trial court must decide which of the parties is more
credible. Moreover, the 1996 amendment does not: 1) define what
constitutes "domestic violence"; 2) proscribe the weight accorded
such finding of domestic violence; 3) determine what, if any, miti-
gating factors the court should consider before making a final
award of custody or visitation; or 4) distinguish, in any way, be-
tween the effect of domestic violence in a custody proceeding as
opposed to a visitation dispute.
A. Credibility Determinations on Issues of Domestic Violence
In cases where domestic violence is alleged, there are often fac-
tual disputes that require the court, as the trier of fact, to make
credibility determinations. The importance of a correct credibility
determination is paramount since a custody/visitation issue may
turn on such determination. Appellate courts give the trial courts,
who directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses, great defer-
ence in making credibility determinations. 7 Trial courts rely upon
those things generally considered by any trier of fact in adjudicat-
14. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 240 Practice Commentary, 240.6 (McKinney
1996).
15. See, e.g., Rohan v. Rohan, 623 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App.. Div. 1995); Acevedo v.
Acevedo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 1994); Antoinette M. v. Paul Seth G., 608
N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1994).
16. See Keating v. Keating, 538 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1989).
17. See Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 687 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 1999);
Hollister v. Hollister, 678 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (App. Div. 1998); In re Millard v. Clap-




ing the credibility of parties' testimony, such as objective cor-
18roborating documentation, previously issued orders of
protections or adjudications of abuse,19 medical records, 20 photo-
graphs21 and non-party witness testimony.22
Trial courts also may seek forensic evaluations from mental
health experts to assist in determining whether the alleged violence
occurred and whether the children of the particular dispute have
been affected. While forensic input may be analyzed, only the
court can assess credibility and the best interests of children. Thus,
the court is duty-bound to critically evaluate any forensic recom-
mendation and not just blindly accept it.23
B. The Definition of Domestic Violence
The 1996 amendment does not define domestic violence. It
would be reasonable, however, for courts to conclude that domes-
tic violence includes the commission of those acts enumerated in
section 812(1) of the FCA24 as family offenses that justify the grant
of an order of protection. In at least one reported decision, the
trial court broadly defined domestic violence to include psychologi-
cal violence and not just overt acts leading to physical injury.25 The
court's definition in that case drew upon the current mental health
18. See In re Hugo F. v. Jeannine F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998) (relying
upon the "documented and undisputed" history of domestic violence in finding un-
supervised visitation inappropriate).
19. See Peters v. Blue, 661 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (observing prior assault
convictions in finding that domestic violence existed). See also Irwin v. Schmidt, 653
N.Y.S.2d 627 (App. Div. 1997); Joseph v. Joseph, 646 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Div. 1996)
(considering prior orders of protection and police intervention in finding domestic
violence).
20. See Joseph, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (admitting evidence of medical records).
21. See Spencer v. Small, 693 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (App. Div. 1999) (admitting pho-
tographs of petitioner's injuries into evidence).
22. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-1747-97, V-1277-97, V-
1278-97, 1998 WL 425464, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 19, 1998)
23. See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 693 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1999) (finding no error
where the trial court did not follow psychologist's recommendation or consider re-
spondent's alleged acts of domestic violence); In re E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257,
261 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (rejecting the court-ordered physician's clinical evaluation and
recommendation.).
24. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 812(1) (McKinney 1998) (listing offenses of disorderly
conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated harassment in the sec-
ond degree, menacing in the second and third degree and attempted assault between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child or members of the same family or
household).
25. See J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
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paradigm that refers to domestic violence as a pattern of behaviors
designed to exercise control over the victim. 26
C. The Weight to Be Given a Finding of Domestic Violence
Once the trial court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that there is domestic violence, the court must go on to consider
what effect, if any, the finding will have on its custody or visitation
determination. Courts often look at domestic violence in the fac-
tual context of an entire case, considering the common law factors
of "best interests" as well. Courts may also consider mitigating fac-
tors, such as the parties' successful efforts at domestic violence
counseling.27 Thus, domestic violence, while a significant consider-
ation in custody and visitation disputes, is not necessarily disposi-
tive of the outcome of the case.
While not dispositive, however, a finding that a parent is a bat-
terer will weigh heavily against an award of custody to that parent.
On the other hand, the same finding will not usually result in the
court denying visitation. In order to deny visitation, the court must
find that contact will have a detrimental effect on the child.28 It is
not enough for the court to conclude that no visitation is in the
child's best interest.29 In many cases where domestic violence is
proven, the court will control the nature, duration and conditions
of visitation, without denying visitation altogether. Courts rely
heavily upon supervised visitation and/or referrals to counseling
programs as appropriate safeguards even where the visiting parent
is an abuser.3 °
D. The "Accused But Not Yet Convicted" Murderer Problem
The 1998 amendment is distinctive from the 1996 amendment in
that it directs a custody result, with limited exceptions, in cases
where the party seeking custody has been convicted of murdering
the child's parent. The 1998 amendment still leaves open to court
26. See id. at 471.
27. See In re Millard v. Clapper, 679 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 1998); Hilliard
v. Peroni, 666 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1997).
28. See Susan G.B. v. Yehiel B.-H., 627 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (App. Div. 1995); Paul
G. v. Donna G., 572 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 1991).
29. See John R. v. Marlene C., 683 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (Fam. Ct. 1998) ("Denial of
visitation is a drastic remedy that should be invoked only when there is substantial
evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child.").
30. See In re Hugo F. v. Jeannie F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998) (finding
unsupervised visitation inappropriate where there is a history of domestic violence);
In re N Children, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 26 (App. Div. Nov. 19, 1996) (directing
therapy before increased access).
942
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
discretion the question of where the child should reside after
arrest, but prior to conviction.31
In general, before a court can consider the custody or visitation
petition of a non-parent, "extraordinary circumstances" must be
established. The courts are divided over whether this threshold is
met when one parent is accused of murdering the other.32 Even
when such extraordinary circumstances are present, the court must
still determine where it would be in the child's "best interest" to
live. Custody cases necessarily require a prediction of future be-
havior based upon past history. The problem with making accurate
predictions for a child's future well-being is exacerbated in these
murder cases, due to the allegations and potential for harm
present.
CONCLUSION
Both the 1996 and 1998 amendments to the DRL focus attention
on the serious, long-lasting, detrimental effect that domestic vio-
lence can have on children living in the household. They each rec-
ognize that children are psychologically damaged by such
behaviors regardless of whether the child, or some other household
member, is the actual victim. The amendments, however, provide
little guidance for the courts and leave many unanswered ques-
tions. Clearly, additional resources and legislation would alleviate
some of these problems.
Victim advocates must recognize that courts' need objective, tan-
gible, corroborating evidence in custody and visitation cases. Ad-
vocates should help their clients prove claims in court by helping
them gather the evidence they need, including medical records,
photographs and police reports. In fact, early intervention with
victims should include evidence collection in the event that there is
a court case.
Absent a legislative mandate, courts will continue to exercise
their discretion in weighing domestic violence against other factors
in custody and visitation cases. Although the statute mandates
courts to consider domestic violence, it is clear that the presence of
violence alone will not be outcome determinative. The legislature
must define "domestic violence" in order for the courts to give this
factor proper consideration. If the legislature continues to give the
trial court unfettered discretion regarding the weight to be given a
31. See Myrna Felder, Murderers and Custody, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at 3.
32. See Ratliff v. Glanda, 693 N.Y.S.2d 319 (App. Div. 1999); O'Guin v. Pikul,
N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1991, at 24 (App. Div. May 16, 1991).
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finding of domestic violence, a more inclusive statutory definition
would be in order. In the event that the legislature decides to
adopt a legislative presumption in accordance with the congres-
sional recommendation, then a more limited statutory definition
would be appropriate.
Many times, the court will direct a final order of supervised visi-
tation where it finds that there has been domestic violence in the
home. Where supervision by a family member or other adult may
be unavailable, unreliable and/or inadequate, the courts should
look to an outside agency to provide such services. Currently,
however, these programs in the New York City area are oversub-
scribed. Also, program hours may not always be convenient to
working parents or school age children. Resources for creating
new programs or expanding the existing programs are needed so
that the court can, with confidence, order supervised visitation as a
feasible safeguard on visitation with a potentially abusive parent.
It is evident that, where a parent has been convicted of the other
parent's murder, the surviving parent should never be awarded
custody. However, until the accused is adjudicated, the court is
faced with the uncertainty of awarding temporary custody to a par-
ent who may indeed be guilty of murder. The legislature should
consider an amendment that permits a third party to seek custody
of the child without having to prove extraordinary circumstances.
In this manner the court can apply the "best interest" standard to
determine custody rather than having to first make a threshold
determination.
The statutory amendments are an important first step in address-
ing the complex issues of domestic violence in child custody/visita-
tion disputes. In the meantime, those in the court system need to
be vigilant in understanding how the laws work and what resources
and improvements are necessary to ensure that children are in safe
home environments.
